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R v Arseneau
[1988] O.J. No. 2525 · Ontario Provincial Court · drive with radar warning device
Read the decisionR. v. Arseneau
[1988] O.J. No. 2525
Ontario Provincial Court - Criminal Division — Bice Prov. Ct. J. | April 12, 1988
Background
Leo Arseneau was pulled over for speeding in Bracebridge, Ontario, and charged under both section 109 (speeding) and section 61 of the Highway Traffic Act (driving with a radar warning device). When Constable Dawson clocked Arseneau's vehicle on radar, he immediately became suspicious that the defendant was using a radar detector. After stopping the vehicle, Arseneau denied having any such device.
The officer searched the car under his authority in section 61(3) of the Highway Traffic Act and found a wire leading from the cigarette lighter to a clip on the dashboard — the type used to hold radar detectors — but no device. When Arseneau offered to open the hood, the officer spotted what looked like a radar detector in the defendant's pocket. Arseneau again denied having the device, so the officer arrested him under section 118 of the Criminal Code for obstruction of justice and seized the radar detector from his pocket.
Issues
- Was the arrest for obstruction of justice lawful?
- Was the search of the defendant's person reasonable under section 8 of the Charter?
- Should evidence obtained through an unlawful search be excluded?
The Bogus Obstruction Arrest
Here's the problem with the officer's strategy: the Highway Traffic Act only gives police the power to search the vehicle for radar detectors under section 61, not the person. So when the device wasn't in the car, the officer got creative. Following a procedure outlined in an Ontario Provincial Police memo, he arrested Arseneau for obstruction of justice under the Criminal Code, which would then give him the power to search the defendant's person.
But Judge Bice wasn't buying it. The court found that simply refusing to hand over the radar detector didn't constitute obstruction of justice — there was no legal obligation for Arseneau to incriminate himself by turning over evidence. The judge referenced R. v. Balsdon, noting that "no man can be compelled to incriminate himself," a principle that predates the Charter and remains valid. Without reasonable and probable grounds for obstruction, the arrest was unlawful, making the search both unlawful and unreasonable under section 8 of the Charter.
Key Takeaway
Police can't manufacture arrests to get around statutory search limitations.
When legislation gives police specific search powers (like searching vehicles under section 61), they can't simply arrest you on trumped-up charges to expand those powers. The exclusion of the radar detector evidence meant the prosecution couldn't prove the section 61 charge, demonstrating that Charter violations have real consequences even in Provincial Offences Act matters.
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R v Boivin
[1978] O.J. No. 1410
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R v Grusko
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R v Henuset
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R v Lavin
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R v Munn
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R v Shannon
[1992] O.J. No. 2652 · Ontario Court of Appeal · driving with radar warning device
Read the decisionR. v. Shannon
[1992] O.J. No. 2652
Ontario Court of Appeal — Houlden, Arbour and Weiler JJ.A. | December 11, 1992
Background
On November 18, 1990, Maureen Shannon was driving when her vehicle passed a marked police cruiser operated by P.C. Fleisham. As her car passed, the VG2 interceptor in the police cruiser was activated. The officer turned around, determined it was Shannon's vehicle that had triggered the device, stopped her, and confiscated a UNIDEN radar detector from her car.
Shannon was charged under section 61(2) of the Highway Traffic Act (now section 79(2)) for driving with a radar warning device. Instead of simply fighting the charge, she brought an application to prohibit the trial from proceeding until she got proper disclosure from the Crown — specifically, she wanted the operator's handbook or service manual for the VG2 interceptor device that detected her radar detector.
Issues
- Was the Crown required to disclose the technical manual for the VG2 interceptor before trial?
- Under what circumstances would such technical disclosure be necessary?
The Disclosure Fight
The motions court judge ordered the Crown to disclose the VG2 manual before trial could proceed. Shannon's defence argued they needed this technical information to properly defend the case. The manufacturer of the VG2 interceptor — sometimes called the 'detector's detector' — would not voluntarily supply that information to the defence since they only sell to law enforcement agencies.
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the pre-trial disclosure order. The court identified only two situations where the VG2 technical information would be relevant: First, if the Crown relied on the VG2 device to prove that the seized device was actually a radar detector. In that case, the defence would be entitled to challenge the VG2's capacity, functioning, and accuracy. Second, if the defence brought a motion to exclude evidence arguing the seizure was made without reasonable grounds.
However, Crown counsel assured the court they would not be using the VG2 device to prove any element of the offence — they would attempt to prove the seized device was a radar detector through other means. The court noted that no motion to exclude evidence had been brought, and any such motion would be premature at this stage.
Key Takeaway
You can't force disclosure of evidence the Crown doesn't plan to use against you.
The court ruled that technical disclosure should be left for the trial judge to decide based on how the Crown actually presents its case and what motions the defence actually brings. Speculative disclosure requests made before trial won't succeed.
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R v Wasylyshen
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R v Zaharia
[1999] O.J. No. 3460
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